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PAYING FOR A PUBLIC GOOD IN MONEY OR TIME: IS THERE A 
FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE?  AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSUMERS’ 
PREFERENCES FOR COMMUNITY-WIDE RECYCLING 
 
G. KIPPERBERG AND D. LARSON 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Public goods cannot be produced optimally from voluntary provision mechanisms.  
This is a fundamental insight that comes out of the canonical model of public good 
provision in economics.  The problem is the free-riding incentive.  Nevertheless, both 
casual and formal observation of peoples’ real-life behavior reveals that they are not 
always compelled to behave as prescribed by theory.  Non-trivial contributions to public 
goods are observed in a variety of settings: charitable giving, volunteering for social 
causes, procurement of environmentally friendly products at price-premiums, and voting 
for political candidates.   
Economists have formulated an assortment of theoretical models that could rationalize 
such behavior; see for example models of impure altruism (Andreoni, 1990), moral 
motivation (Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg, 2003), identity preferences (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000), social norms (Holländer, 1990), and models of fairness and reciprocity 
(Rabin, 1993), to mention but a few.
i  None of this literature explores the potential role 
that the means of payment or, more narrowly, the contribution currency itself, may play 
in determining the level of voluntary provision.  Typically, agents in the models which 
produce predictions of voluntary public goods provision are implicitly assumed to face 
only one constraint in making their choices, namely a money budget.  Yet it is evident 
that time is an important (and for many, a more important) constraint on choice, and how 
people spend their time is also an important signal of their willingness to provide public 
goods. 
    This paper uses Becker’s two-constraint model of consumer choice (Becker, 1965) to 
address the following fundamental question: Does the means of payment affect the 
magnitude of willingness to pay for public goods?  When people are constrained by time  
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as well as by money, their willingness to spend scarce time to obtain public goods is also 
a signal of their value.  If the time spent is shadow-priced properly, are the two measures 
of willingness to pay equal, or does the way in which payment is made influence how 
much people are willing to contribute?  An example may serve to illustrate this question.  
A person known to have a value of time of $15 per hour is asked to contribute 1 hour of 
that time towards a specific public good improvement.  Would this person be more or less 
likely to contribute an hour of her time than to contribute $15 out of her wallet?  Or 
would she be indifferent? 
  Several hypotheses can be put forth for why spending a specific amount of one’s time 
would be perceived as different from spending its monetary equivalent.  At the most 
basic level, spending time means a person engages directly in an activity (or activities) to 
produce the public goods.  If this activity generates utility (or disutility) in and of itself, 
the person may prefer to be more (or less) directly involved.
ii   In related reasoning, 
Andreoni’s model of impure altruism suggests that agents obtain utility from the act of 
giving itself  (“warm-glow”), as well as from the resulting public good, which produces a 
voluntary contribution equilibrium with less than full free riding.
iii   The currency of 
payment for public goods might also matter if agents have some form of socially 
contingent preferences.  Examples of this are preferences for attaining a specific identity 
as in Akerlof and Kranton, or live up to prescribed social norms, perhaps, as a way to 
gain social approval or avoid social disapproval, as in Holländer.  In such contexts, the 
exertion of personal effort might be more visible to a person’s peer group than spending 
money, hence, making time a more productive currency.
 iv   The notion that personal 
effort constitutes a stronger signaling device clearly has important implications that carry 
over to models of reciprocity as well.  Implicit cooperation would seem to be more 
achievable when the actions of others are readily observed. 
    The public good examined in this paper is community recycling.  We investigate 
consumers’ preferences for a non-marginal increase in their community’s recycling rate.  
This recycling rate measures the fraction of all wastes, generated throughout the 
community economy, diverted away from landfills and other disposal methods for re-
processing and secondary uses.  To the extent that consumers perceive waste materials  
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(ending up in landfills) as a public bad or conservation of resources as a public good, an 
increase in the level of recycling can be regarded as a public good.  How do consumers 
value a specific increase in their community-wide recycling rate?  Individual valuations 
will likely vary a great deal in the population and depend on the manner in which the 
recycling goal is proposed and implemented.   
An important feature of our study is that an increase in the level of recycling can in 
actuality be achieved in several ways, varying in the amount public financing required 
and in how much consumer involvement is relied upon.
v  Throughout the United States, 
consumers already engage in wide-spread waste-sorting, frequently, in the absence of any 
economic incentives (Kinnaman, 2000).  Moreover, the cost-effectiveness of many types 
of community recycling programs depends in large part on how willing consumers are to 
participate in them.  As such, community recycling serves as an ideal setting for 
investigating the potential relationships between the means of payment and the 
magnitude of payment for public goods.     
  Our empirical analysis is based on data from a contingent valuation (CV) experiment 
conducted as part of a recent survey of Seattle residents.  The current community-wide 
recycling rate in Seattle is 40%, but city officials have set 60% as the long term goal.  
The broad purpose of the survey was to collect data on households’ recycling behavior 
and preferences for current and potential new recycling programs that could achieve the 
goal of 60% community-wide recycling. 
  CV experiments are commonly used by environmental economists to assess the 
economic value of non-marketed public goods such as environmental quality 
improvements.  While traditional CV experiments have elicited consumers’ preferences 
in terms of their willingness to pay money (WTPM), a recent innovation is to also elicit 
preferences in terms of willingness to pay time (WTPT); see Larson et al. (2004) for the 
first application.  Surveys that elicit both WTPM and WTPT generate richer data on 
consumer preferences than has been typical from CV experiments.  This approach has the 
double payoff in that one can learn about the value of consumers’ time as well as their 
WTP for the public good in question.   
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  In the empirical part of this paper, we first estimate separately consumers’ WTPM and 
WTPT for an increase in the community recycling rate from 40% to 60% and investigate 
how these two WTP measures vary with personal characteristics, at wit, socioeconomics 
and general attitudes.  Secondly, results from joint estimation of WTPM, WTPT, and the 
money value of time support our hypothesis that the payment currency matters.  The 
remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data.  Section 3 
outlines the analytical framework while Section 4 presents the results.  Finally, Section 5 
offers some concluding remarks. 
   
2.  THE SURVEY DATA 
  Our empirical analysis is based on data from a mail-mode survey carried out between 
November 2004 and February 2005 in Seattle, Washington.  The survey was designed, 
tested, and implemented in accordance with the principles of the Tailored Design Method 
(Dillman, 2000).  Its broad purpose was to collect data on households’ recycling behavior 
and preferences for current and new recycling program, to be used in program evaluation 
and policy design.  Survey questionnaires were sent out to 2000 households.  Half of 
these contained a CV experiment eliciting WTP money and WTP time for attaining an 
increase in the community-wide recycling rate.
vi  Of these 1000 surveys, about 550 were 
returned to us.  Accounting for item-non response we end up with usable data on 506 
individuals.  
 
The Contingent Valuation Experiment 
  The CV experiment started out with an introductory statement about the recycling goal 
and the purpose of the accompanying questions: 
 
Seattle is currently recycling 40% of all waste generate by households and 
businesses.  The City’s long term goal is to increase the overall recycling rate to 
60%.  We would like to learn how you would value two programs that could 
achieve the 60% recycling goal and how much money or time you might be 
willing to contribute towards this goal.  
 
5
  The experiment proceeded to ask whether the participants’ were willing to pay a 
specific amount of money per month for programs that would require general public 
financing, but would achieve the goal without affecting households’ own efforts.   
Specifically, this policy scenario was presented in terms of new recycling programs 
external to the household sector, currently being investigated by City planners.  The 
recycling rate increase is achieved in this scenario through expansion of recycling 
opportunities for businesses and local organizations and implementation of post-disposal 
waste sorting at a central sorting facility.   The question used an increase in the household 
monthly utility bill as payment vehicle, with explicit statements that no change in 
household recycling time would be expected.  The second CV question asked whether the 
participants’ would be willing to spend a specific amount of time, presented in minutes 
per week, for programs that would require additional household effort to achieve the 
recycling goal, but would be provided free of charge.    In this policy scenario, which is 
also based on current research by City planners, the increase in the community-wide 
recycling rate is achieved through expansion of existing curbside recycling programs, 
which would permit households to sort out additional recyclable materials.  The question 
used an increase in recycling time, with no change in household money cost, as the 
payment vehicle.  Both CV experiments used a closed-ended with follow-up question 
format, generating four observations on willingness to pay money and time per 
participant.  As usual, the bid amounts were experimentally varied across the survey 
versions, after careful pre-testing, and assigned randomly throughout the sample.   
 
Bid Amounts and Response Distributions 
  Initial bid amounts for the WTPM question were $2, $4, $8, $10, $12, and $15 per 
month.  The high follow-up bids (presented to those that answered “yes” to the first bid) 
ranged from $4 to $30.  The low follow-up bids (presented to those that answered “no” to 
the first bid) ranged from $1 to $6.  The WTPT question started out at 5, 10, 15, 20 or 30 
minutes per week.  The high follow-ups ranged from 10 to 60 minutes while the low 
follow-ups ranged from 2 to 15 minutes.  Table 1 summarizes the distribution of 
responses (please see Appendix 1 for tables and figures).  For the WTP money question,  
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31% answered “no” to both bid amounts, 40% answer “no” to the initial bid, but accepted 
the second bid, 21% accepted the first bid but rejected the follow-up bid, while 8% 
answered “yes” to both bid amounts.  For the WTP time question, the acceptance 
propensity was much higher.  Only 10% answered “no” to both bid amounts, 18% said 
“no-yes”, 32% said “yes-no”, and, as many as 40% accepted both time bids.  Responses 
to both questions satisfy a basic test of consistency with economic theory.  The 
probability of a “yes” is declining in the bid amounts, with correlation coefficients of -
0.28 in the money question and -0.24 in the time question. 
 
Covariates for Empirical Analysis 
 The  survey  collected detailed background information on the participants, including 
information on their demographic and socioeconomic status, general attitudes towards 
recycling, the environment, and public giving, in addition to information on their current 
recycling activities and related behavior.  Here, we limit the analysis to the use of some 
basic socioeconomic and attitude information in explaining the CV responses.  The 
socioeconomic profile for the sample of participants is as follows: 49% are males, the 
average age is 49, the average years of schooling is 16, 12% belong to households with 
annual household income of more than $150,000, the average household size is 2.4, and 
89% owns their own home.  Descriptive statistics for the responses to the attitude 
questions are reported in table 2.  For these questions the participants were asked to 
indicate their degree of agreement with several statements, with “strongly disagree” 
coded as 1, “neutral” coded as 3, and “strongly agree” coded as 5.  Statements A1-A5 
were intended to capture attitudes towards environmental and natural resource issues, A6-
A10 were intended to capture attitudes towards altruistic behavior, statements A11-A18 
elicited reasons for why they engage in recycling, and statements A19-A25 probed 
reasons that might reduce people’s willingness to participate in recycling programs.   
  By design, several of the attitudinal measures are highly correlated (since they were 
intended to “uncover” latent motivations).  To deal with this issue, and in order to reduce 
the dimensionality of the attitude data, we employed factor analysis.  This yielded seven  
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factor scores that we use in the ensuing empirical investigation of WTP money and WTP 
time.  A description is provided in Appendix 2. 
 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Theoretical Model of Consumer Recycling Choices and Willingness to Pay 
  The underlying model of consumer choice is one of utility maximization subject to 
two binding constraints (time and money) and of contributions towards public goods 
(Becker; Andreoni).  The idea of monetary contributions is standard in the literature on 
giving, but many types of public goods can also be provided by contributions of time by 
volunteers who organize, build, construct, or otherwise produce the public good.   
Recycling programs, the subject of our analysis, are one such type of public good.   
Increases in city-wide recycling rates, a public policy goal in many communities around 
the nation, can be achieved in several ways.  On the one hand, consumers can fund 
financially programs undertaken by others to improve the collection, sorting, and 
recovery of recycling materials from the waste stream.  On the other hand, increased 
personal recycling, which involves primarily increased use of household time, can 
achieve the same goals.
 
Our model of contribution reflects these multiple ways in which consumers can 
provide public goods.  Arguments of the utility function are activities xi that the 
consumer engages in, each of which has a time price ti and a money price pi.
vii  Utility 
u(x,R,G
M,G
T,s) is a function of the activities x = [x1,…,xI], which are private goods, and  
a publicly-provided good R = R(ΣnGn
M, ΣnGn
T ), whose level is based on contributions of 
both time (ΣnGn
T) and money (ΣnGn
M) by all consumers.  Individual n’s utility also may 
depend directly on their personal contributions or spending one’s time, and reflects 
possible private benefits from giving such as warm glows, social approval and so forth.  
Other observable demographics of the consumer, s = [s1,…,sm], also affect the utility 
from activity consumption.  Finally, the constraints faced by the consumer in making her 
activity choices are the money budget M = px and the time budget T = tx.  Both 
constraints are assumed to be continuously binding, which is not a particularly strong  
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condition on choice.  The primal version of the problem leads to the indirect utility 
function V(p,t,s,R,M,T), defined as 
 
(1)    V(p,t,s,R,M,T) ≡ max u(x,R,G
M,G
T,s) + λ [M – px - G
M ] + µ [T – tx – G
T ]. 
 
A key element of two-constraint models such as (1) above is the shadow value of time, 
ρ = µ/λ, the ratio of the shadow values on the time and money constraints, respectively.  
While in Becker’s work and much subsequent work, a joint labor supply decision implies 
that the shadow value of non-work time is the wage, this link needn’t hold, for a variety 
of reasons.
viii  Our consumer choice problem intentionally does not include a labor supply 
decision, to emphasize that the value of non-work time in our model is not linked to the 
labor supply and wage.  Instead, it is estimated jointly with other decisions in the model.  
  If the shadow value of time ρ(p,t,s,R,M,T) is a function of a person’s characteristics 
and other exogenous factors, but not of the prices and budgets they face, i.e., ρ = ρ(s, R), 
then indirect utility is a function of full prices and full budgets, see Larson and Shaikh 
(2001).  That is, indirect utility can be written as  
 
V(p,t,s,R,M,T) =  V(p1+ρt1,…,pI+ρtI,s,R,M+ρT) 
 
as in the standard Becker model, even though the shadow value of time is a latent 
function rather than an observable economic variable such as the wage.  It is helpful to 
exploit this structure of two-constraint choice models in formulating the joint model of 
money contributions, time contributions, and the shadow value of time. 
  Our analysis focuses on peoples’ responses to the recycling options they face, some of 
which involve money payments to procure higher levels of a public good, others of which 
involve time contributions for the same purpose.  In keeping with the linear-in-
parameters form of indirect utility used to motivate discrete choice models, and the full 
prices/budgets considerations above, we specify conditional indirect utility as 
 
( 2 )       V   =   βM(p1+ρt1) + α
M + α
T + βRR  
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recognizing that the other arguments of indirect utility (M, T, p2+ρt2,…, pn+ρtn) will drop 
out of utility differences when comparisons between recycling alternatives are made.   
The parameter α
M represents the private benefit of money giving, e.g., warm glow or 
social approval, arising from one’s money contributions (G
M);  α
T analogously is the 
private benefit of giving time for the public good (G
T).  Part of this private benefit of 
giving time (α
M /ρ) is the time-denominated warm glow from giving; the remainder (α
T - 
α
M /ρ) is the effect of how payment for the public good is made on utility.  Put another 
way, the private benefit α
T of contributing time for an increase in R may differ from the 
time-equivalent of warm glow from giving money (α
M/ρ) because contributing time is a 
more, or less, preferred currency for paying for R. 
  When a person is asked to choose between paying $p for ∆R and not having ∆R, the 
utility difference is 
 
( 3 )       ∆V
p
 =  βMp1 + α
M + β∆R. 
 
Instead, if asked whether she would be willing to spend t hours in order to help provide R, 
the utility difference would be 
 
( 4 )       ∆V
t
 =  βMρt1 + α
T + β∆R. 
 
Thus, in comparing the difference in utility from paying $p instead of t hours in order to 
acquire R is 
 




Statistical Models for WTP Money and WTP Time 
  We analyze the response data generated by the CV experiment within a direct WTP 
estimation framework.  Since it is the same public good improvement that is being valued 
in both scenarios, we represent the total benefits by two parameters αPG(M) and αPG(T)  
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respectively, which in general can be made functions of covariates.  The first parameter 
corresponds to (α
M + β∆RR)/ βM in equation (3) and the second parameter corresponds to 
(α
T + β∆RR)/ βMρ in equation (4).  The stochastic representations of WTPM and WTPT 
are as follows 
 
( 6 )       W T P M   =   αPG(M) + σMεM    
( 7 )       W T P T   =   αPG(T) + σTεT 
 
where  εM and εT are assumed to have standard normal distributions (potentially 
correlated).   The probability of a “yes” response to a specific money bid (MBID) or time 
bid (TBID) is given by 
 
(8)        Pr[Yes to MBID] = Pr[(αPG(M) - MBID) / σM > - εM] 
(9)        Pr[Yes to TBID] = Pr[(αPG(T) - TBID) / σT > - εT]. 
 
  If the benefits are the same across the two scenarios, such that WTPM = ρ·WTPT, 
where ρ is the latent money value of time, then the probabilities (8) and (9) can be 
estimated by imposing the restriction αPG(T) = ρ
-1·αPG(T) (see Larson et al.).  However, the 
hypothesis in this paper is that this may not be true due to differences in private-good 
benefits arising from contributing to the public good improvement in money versus time.  
Formally, define ∆WTPM ≡ WTPM - ρ·WTPT (which can be non-zero) as the difference 
in the WTP money in the first scenario and the monetary equivalent of WTP time in the 
second scenario.  Based on equations (6) and (7) the stochastic representation of this 
benefit difference is 
 
(10)     ∆WTPM = (αPG(M) - ρ·αPG(T)) + (σMεM - ρ·σTεT). 
 
  By comparing response patterns across the two CV questions, we can express the 
probability that an individual prefer to obtain the public good improvement while paying 
MBID over obtaining the public good improvement while paying TBID as  
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(11)    Pr[∆WTPM > 0] = Pr[Yes to MBID, No to TBID] = 












PG is distributed standard normal.
ix  
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
  In this section we present some preliminary results.  First, we show estimation results 
for WTP money based on equations (6) and (8).  Second, we present WTP time results, 
based on equations (7) and (9).  For these estimations, we utilize the fact that we have 
two responses per participant to each CV question and implement bivariate probit models, 
following the suggestion by Cameron and Quiggin (1994).
x  Finally, we illustrate joint 
estimation of WTPM, WTPT, and the money value of time, based on probability 
statements (8), (9) and (11).  These results are inefficient, in the sense that we have 
ignored potential error correlations. 
 
Results for WTP Money 
  Table 3 shows results for four different models.  Model 1 is an intercept-only model, 
which gives mean WTPM directly.  Model 2 includes socioeconomic covariates, Model 3 
includes attitude covariates, and model 4 has both socioeconomic and attitude covariates.  
All models are statistically significant overall.  Model 1 is statistically different from a 
“coin-flip” model at a 0.01 level of significance.  Model 2 and 3 are improvements over 
model 1, with likelihood ratio tests rejecting the model 1 restriction at a 99% level of 
confidence.  Likewise, model 4 is superior to models 2 and 3 by appropriate likelihood 
ratio tests. 
  The mean willingness to pay is similar across estimations.  The results suggest that 
households are willing to pay on average about $4 per household per month to achieve an 
increase in the community-wide from 40% to 60%.  Among the socioeconomic 
covariates, WTPM appears to be decreasing in the participant’s age and increasing in the 
level of education.  Members of households that earn more that $150,000 have a higher 
WTPM all else equal.    
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  Several of the attitude factors are statistically significant (please see Appendix 2 for 
factor interpretations).  The “green consumer” factor (F1), “general altruism” factor (F2), 
and the “concern for earth and living things” factor (F3) enter positively into the 
estimated WTPM function.  The “technological optimist” factor (F4) enters negatively.  
These results are consistent with the idea that community recycling is seen as a public 
good and that contributing towards and increase in the recycling rate through money 
financing of additional recycling programs has a private-good benefit dimension.   
Interestingly, the “external motivations” factor (F6) has a negative sign.  This suggests 
that those who see recycling as a way to save money, or express they engage in recycling 
to appear responsible to others have smaller WTPM in this policy scenario.  However, it 
should be noted that this covariate is only significant in model 3, not in model 4. 
 
Results for WTP Time 
  Table 4 provides estimation results for WTPT.  Again, four different specifications are 
reported.  Each model is statistically significant overall and the preferred model in terms 
of best statistical fit is model 4.  Mean WTPT is similar across the models at about 2.2 
hours per household per month.  The estimated WTPT function is decreasing in age and 
increasing in level of education, though the age covariate is not significant in model 2. 
  As for WTPM above, the “green consumer” factor (F1) is statistically significant 
determinant of WTPT and the “technological optimist” (F4) enters negatively.  In 
contrast to above, the “general altruism” factor (F2) is only significant in model 3 (not in 
model 4) and the “concern for earth and living things” is insignificant.  The “private 
technological constraints” factor (F5), which was insignificant in the WTPM models, 
enters negatively into the estimated WTPT function.  Overall, these estimation results are 
consistent with the notion that there are both public- and private-good dimensions 
associated with this policy scenario as well.  
 
Joint Estimation of WTPM, WTPT, and the Money Value of Time 
  Taken at face value, the above results suggest an average money value of time of 
about $1.80 per hour ($4/2.2).  This assumes that contributing money and time have the  
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same associated total benefits such that when time is valued appropriately, WTPM is 
equal to the monetary value of WTPT.  In table 5 we present results for joint estimation 
of WTPM, WTPT, and the money value of time (MVT).  As can be seen, the WTPM and 
WTPT estimates (AlphaM and AlphaT) are similar to before: Mean WTPM is about $4 
per household per month and mean WTPT is about 2.3 per household per month.   
However, the joint estimate of MVT is about $5.6.
xi   This implies that the money-
equivalent of WTPT is about $13 ($5.6·2.3) per household per month, in the time 
payment scenario.  Hence, it appears that consumers value the ability to pay or contribute 
towards achieving the 60% recycling goals much more highly when they are permitted to 
be directly involved through their time effort. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  This paper has explored the private-public good dimensions of paying for public good 
improvements.  Specifically, it analyzed consumers’ willingness to pay money (WTPM) 
and willingness to pay time (WTPT) for an increase in their community’s recycling rate 
from 40% to 60%.  We explored the hypothesis that two contribution scenarios, one 
requiring money payment and one requiring time payment, may have different private-
good implications, hence resulting in divergence between the two WTP measures, even 
when time is appropriately shadow-valued (and the public good improvement is held 
constant).  Across several empirical model specifications, estimated mean WTPM was 
about $4 and estimated WTPT was about 2.2 hours (both on per household per month 
basis).  Joint estimation of WTPM, WTPT, and the money value of time suggested 
stronger preferences, and hence higher WTP in money-equivalence, for reaching the 
recycling goal through direct consumer involvement.  This result may have important 
implications for how public agencies design and promote public recycling programs.   
Moreover, this aspect of public good provisions may have similar implications for how 
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APPENDIX 1: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Distribution of CV Responses for Money and Time WTP Bids 
Initial  $  Bids  Observations  NN NY YN YY 
2  62 26% 26% 26% 23% 
4  92 23% 29% 43%  4% 
8  99 30% 40% 20%  9% 
10  110 33% 46% 13%  8% 
12  109 35% 50% 11%  4% 
15  34 44% 38% 12%  6% 
  506 31% 40% 21%  8% 
        
Initial  Time  Bids  Observation  NN NY YN YY 
5  94 9% 5%  27%  60% 
10  87  6% 15% 32% 47% 
15  104  8% 10% 38% 45% 
20  114 15% 22% 33% 30% 
30  107 14% 34% 29% 23% 
  506 10% 18% 32% 40% 
 
 
Table 2: Attitude Questions 
ID Attitude Statements (Strongly Disagree = 1, Neutral = 3, Strongly Agree = 5) Mean St. Dev. Min Max
A1 The ecological crisis facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated. 1.96 1.20 1 5
A2 Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist. 3.89 1.18 1 5
A3 Human resourcefulness will insure that we do not make the earth unlivable. 3.32 1.30 1 5
A4 The earth has very limited room and resources. 4.07 1.11 1 5
A5 The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of industrial nations. 1.83 1.02 1 5
A6 Contributions to community organizations rarely improve the lives of others. 2.02 1.08 1 5
A7 The individual alone is responsible for his or her well-being in life. 2.77 1.29 1 5
A8 It is my ethical duty to help other people when they are unable to help themselves. 3.90 0.91 1 5
A9 My responsibility is to provide only for my family and myself. 2.14 1.11 1 5
A10 My personal actions can greatly improve the well-being of people I don’t know. 4.03 0.94 1 5
I recycle because..
A11 ..It saves me money since I am able to use a smaller garbage container. 3.11 1.35 1 5
A12 ..I want to be a socially responsible person. 4.43 0.78 1 5
A13 ..I want other people to think of me as a responsible person. 3.15 1.18 1 5
A14 ..Regardless of what other people might think, I feel it is my ethical duty. 4.34 0.86 1 5
A15 ..I find it to be a pleasant activity in itself, compared to other ‘everyday’ chores. 3.01 1.06 1 5
A16 ..It is a good way to contribute to preserving environmental quality. 4.50 0.70 1 5
A17 ..It is a good way to contribute to conserving scarce natural resources. 4.49 0.74 1 5
A18 ..I feel it is expected of me. 3.59 1.08 1 5
I hesitate to recycle because..
A19 ..I don’t think recycling benefits me personally. 1.73 0.93 1 5
A20 ..I don’t think recycling provides benefits to the community/society. 1.46 0.81 1 5
A21 ..It is often difficult to know what items can or cannot be recycled. 2.79 1.21 1 5
A22 ..It takes too much time. 1.83 0.97 1 5
A23 ..I don’t have enough recyclables. 1.62 0.90 1 5
A24 ..It is difficult to find room/space for temporarily storing recyclable items. 2.23 1.25 1 5
A25 ..Other people are not doing enough. 2.97 1.23 1 5  
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Willingness to Pay Money (WTPM) 
Variable Coef. St. Er. P-Value Coef. St. Er. P-Value Coef. St. Er. P-Value Coef. St. Er. P-Value
ALPHA_M:
Constant 3.7819 0.7643 0.0000 -1.4619 4.2314 0.3649 3.6257 0.7724 0.0000 1.8330 4.3297 0.3360
Gend . . . 0.9482 0.9598 0.1616 . . . 1.9779 1.0226 0.0265
Age/10 . . . -1.3066 0.3651 0.0002 . . . -1.1639 0.3738 0.0009
Edu/10 . . . 6.1870 1.8646 0.0005 . . . 3.4911 1.9591 0.0374
DHInc . . . 2.6114 1.4595 0.0368 . . . 3.2344 1.5032 0.0157
HHSIZE . . . -0.2619 0.4068 0.2599 . . . -0.1154 0.4060 0.3881
OWN . . . 1.7975 1.5881 0.1289 . . . 0.9356 1.6019 0.2796
F 1 ...... 0 .7767 0.4988 0.0597 0.9393 0.4804 0.0253
F 2 ...... 2 .2103 0.5969 0.0001 1.9322 0.5757 0.0004
F 3 ...... 1 .9325 0.5950 0.0006 1.7244 0.5515 0.0009
F 4 ...... - 1 .4390 0.5218 0.0029 -0.9970 0.5033 0.0238
F 5 ...... - 0 .2888 0.4955 0.2800 -0.3629 0.4703 0.2201
F 6 ...... - 0 .9833 0.5048 0.0257 -0.4057 0.4749 0.1965
F 7 ...... - 0 .4287 0.4993 0.1952 -0.1626 0.4841 0.3685
sigma 12.0272 1.9489 0.0000 10.8094 1.6082 0.0000 11.7990 1.9426 0.0000 11.0359 1.6709 0.0000
rhostar* 0.2179 0.2617 0.2025 0.2195 0.2669 0.2054 0.0634 0.2645 0.4053 0.0390 0.2515 0.4384
LL @ Covergence -1.2491 -1.2080 -1.2013 -1.1732
Equally Likely LL -1.3863 -1.3863 -1.3863 -1.3863
NOBS 506 506 506 506
WTPM (Mean)** $3.78 $4.04 $3.71 $3.87
WTPM (St. Dev.) $3.08 $3.56 $4.30
*   Estimated as follows: rho =  (1-exp(-rhostar))/(1+exp(-rhostar))
** Calculated for each individual at parameter point estimates and averaged.
BIVARIATE PROBIT MODELS OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY MONEY
M O D E L  1M O D E L  2M O D E L  3M O D E L  4
 
 
Table 4: Estimation Results for Willingness to Pay Time (WTPT) 
Variable Coef. St. Er. P-Value Coef. St. Er. P-Value Coef. St. Er. P-Value Coef. St. Er. P-Value
ALPHA_T:
Constant 2.2417 0.1132 0.0000 0.9563 0.7650 0.1056 2.2102 0.1012 0.0000 1.5518 0.7467 0.0188
Gend . . . -0.2052 0.1773 0.1236 . . . -0.1551 0.1707 0.1818
Age/10 . . . -0.0789 0.0625 0.1034 . . . -0.1000 0.0608 0.0499
Edu/10 . . . 0.8427 0.3299 0.0053 . . . 0.5358 0.3343 0.0545
DHInc . . . -0.2670 0.2688 0.1603 . . . -0.1769 0.2529 0.2421
HHSIZE . . . 0.0880 0.0752 0.1209 . . . 0.0936 0.0709 0.0934
OWN . . . 0.2115 0.2885 0.2318 . . . 0.1470 0.2736 0.2955
F 1 ...... 0 . 2 0 1 0 0 . 0 8 0 9 0 . 0 0 6 5 0 . 1 9 2 6 0 . 0 8 0 3 0 . 0 0 8 2
F 2 ...... 0 . 1 6 3 2 0 . 0 8 6 7 0 . 0 2 9 9 0 . 0 9 7 2 0 . 0 8 9 5 0 . 1 3 8 6
F 3 ...... 0 . 0 6 0 6 0 . 0 8 4 7 0 . 2 3 7 3 0 . 0 5 6 0 0 . 0 8 3 8 0 . 2 5 2 0
F 4 ...... - 0 . 1 6 7 2 0 . 0 8 1 4 0 . 0 2 0 0 - 0 . 1 1 2 4 0 . 0 8 3 5 0 . 0 8 9 2
F 5 ...... - 0 . 4 3 8 7 0 . 0 8 5 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 - 0 . 4 3 9 1 0 . 0 8 3 4 0 . 0 0 0 0
F 6 ...... - 0 . 0 3 3 4 0 . 0 7 9 4 0 . 3 3 6 8 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 . 0 8 2 1 0 . 4 3 6 7
F 7 ...... 0 . 0 1 1 1 0 . 0 8 4 6 0 . 4 4 7 9 0 . 0 5 6 1 0 . 0 8 3 4 0 . 2 5 0 9
sigma 1.9015 0.1899 0.0000 1.8259 0.1742 0.0000 1.7308 0.1594 0.0000 1.6911 0.1517 0.0000
rhostar 1.2342 0.2933 0.0000 1.2569 0.2954 0.0000 1.2483 0.3003 0.0000 1.2484 0.2995 0.0000
LL @ Covergence -1.2115 -1.1982 -1.1699 -1.1602
Equally Likely LL -1.3863 -1.3863 -1.3863 -1.3863
NOBS 506 506 506 506
WTPT (Mean)** $2.24 $2.22 $2.21 $2.20
WTPT (St. Dev.) $0.32 $0.54 $0.59
*   Estimated as follows: rho =  (1-exp(-rhostar))/(1+exp(-rhostar))
** Calculated for each individual at parameter point estimates and averaged.
BIVARIATE PROBIT MODELS OF WILLINGNESS TO PAY TIME




Table 5: Joint Estimation of WTPM, WTPT, and the Money Value of Time (MVT) 
Variable Coef. St. Er. P-Value
AlphaM 4.0353 0.3373 0.0000
AlphaT 2.3078 0.0699 0.0000
MVT 5.6267 0.4972 0.0000
SigmaM 8.0653 0.4328 0.0000
SigmaT 1.6017 0.0834 0.0000
Equally Likely LL -0.69315







APPENDIX 2: FACTOR ANALYSIS FOR ATTITUDE DATA 
  The attitude data presented in table 2 were analyzed via factor analysis is SPSS 
Student Version 12.0.  The 25 attitudinal measures reduced to seven factors, using the 
principal component extraction method with VARIMAX rotation.  Based on relative 
loading (loading coefficient > |0.5|), we give these seven factors the following labels: 
 
F1: “Green Consumer” 
F2: “General Altruism” 
F3: “New Environmental Paradigm: Concern for Earth and Living Things” 
F4: “New Environmental Paradigm: Technological Optimist” 
F5: “Private Technological Constraints”  
F6: “Externally Motivated” 
F7: “Free Rider Awareness (Negative Reciprocity)” 
 
  Paraphrasing the original attitude statements, one interpretation is as follows.  1) 
Someone who scored high on F1 sees recycling as a way to contribute to resource 
conservation and improving environmental quality, to be socially responsible, and to 
satisfy an intrinsic ethical duty.  2) Someone who scored high on F2 sees contributing to 
public causes as effective and part of one’s personal responsibility.  3) Someone who 
scored high on F3 thinks the earth has limited resources and that plants and animals have 
rights, alongside humans.  4) Someone who scored high on F4 thinks the ecological crisis 
is exaggerated, that nature is resilient, and that human creativity can resolve whatever 
environmental problems might arise.  5) Someone who scored high one F5 sees recycling 
as too time consuming, requiring too much storage, difficult due to lack of information, 
and not privately beneficial due to insufficient recyclable materials.  6) Someone who 
scored high on F6 sees recycling as a way to save money and appear responsible in the 
eyes of others, something that others expects one to do.  7) Someone who scored high on 






                                                 
i See Nyborg and Rege (2003) for an overview of various public good contribution models. 
ii This idea is related to whether individuals’ values of time bear a relation to the wage.  Consider a two-
constraint (money and time) model of consumer choice, in which an individual is paid per hour worked and 
is free to choose how many hours to spend in employment.  Such a model implies that the value of time is 
equal to the wage rate only when work is utility-neutral.  If work yield utility (or disutility), the value of 
time is less (greater) than the wage. 
iii The basic model does not account for a time budget.  Nevertheless, to the extent that agents are motivated 
in their behavior by the suggested motivation, it would seem likely that paying for the public good in 
money versus time is distinctly different: contributing one’s effort directly may be regarded as more 
genuine (less selfish) hence generating greater warm-glow benefits.  In the model of Brekke et al. agents 
choose effort towards production of a public good, and are better off, ceteris paribus, the closer their actual 
effort is to a “morally ideal effort”.  The model does not have built into it a substitution possibility between 
contributing money versus time towards the public good, which may makes sense in cases of morally 
motivated behavior: it seems reasonable that contributing directly is a more productive way of satisfying 
such preferences.  Indeed, paying money might even be entirely unproductive since it may not be possible 
to pay oneself free from a perceived ethical responsibility. 
iv For the same reason, socially contingent preferences could result in agents disfavoring new projects that 
rely on time payments.  For example, consider a policy intended to increase the level of a specific public 
good.  If one’s time contribution is more visible to others than money contributions, then new programs 
that rely on time contributions can lead to tightened social expectations and stronger social enforcement.  
All else equal, this reduces individual welfare.  In the empirical part of this paper, we explore both the 
possibility that money as a payment currency is preferred over time as payment currency, as well as the 
converse.   
v At one extreme, all household waste could be collected as single-stream, taken to a central waste sorting 
facility, where recycle materials are sorted out by paid workers.  At the other extreme, consumers could 
sort all recyclable materials in their home, and subsequently take them to recycling centers.  
vi The survey had one section asking revealed preference-stated behavior questions, two stated preference 
sections – one asking CV questions and one containing a choice experiment, in addition to two sections 
soliciting socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes respectively.  There were a total of 30 different 
questionnaire versions used, half asking CV questions about current recycling programs and half containing 
the CV experiment for new programs.  Aside from the choice of survey mode, the CV experiment was 
designed and implemented in accordance with the recommendation of Arrow et al. (1993).  Further details 
can be found in Bagby et al., (2005) and Bagby et al. (2004).   
vii Activities needn’t have both time and money prices (as, for example, with walks in the park or automatic 
bill payments), but they must have at least one. 
viii Among these is the fact that work time may itself be a source of utility or disutility, or that the consumer 
is unable to smoothly adjust her amounts of work and non-work time consumed, see Bockstael et al. (1987). 
ix Specifically, if a person said “yes” to money bid k and “no” to time bid j we can say that obtaining the 
public good improvement while paying MBIDK is “revealed preferred to obtaining the public good 
improvement at TBIDj. 
x  Here, we focus on restricted specifications where both mean willingness to pay and the scale of 
willingness to pay is the same across the pair of responses. 
xi  In extension of this research, we will specify the latent value of time as a function of observable 
characteristics, hence, permitting the value of time to vary across individuals. 